FROM THE PRESENTATION (Part B) Chapter 1 Forging the Regime Completing the 'Legal Revolution' Within a year and a half of Hitler's accession to the chancellorship in January 1933, the Nazis consolidated totalitarian control through an effort that they defined as 'The Legal Revolution.' This definition, stressing the legality of the actions taken, invested the Nazis' strong-arm usurpation of power with a dimension of ostensible lawfulness. In contrast to the revolutionary tendencies that motivated large groups in the party and the SA, Hitler tried to act through legal measures. This lent his regime an image of legitimacy. When President Hindenburg died in August 1934, and after he had secured the army's loyalty, Hitler fused the office of Chancellor with that of President, including command over the army, thereby becoming Fuehrer und Reichskanzler (Leader and Chancellor of the Reich) . From then on, Hitler could pursue his aims without having to face any opposition to his total dominion. More On The World Response The Nazis' accession to power in Germany in early 1933 roused many doubts among the leading world powers, but the trauma of World War I inhibited them from taking any concrete measures. In Great Britain, the government pondered whether Hitler as Chancellor would re - adopt the expansionist policies of Wilhelmine Germany. The French, although disgusted by the new regime in Berlin, also preferred to wait and see what the Nazi regime had in mind. Many also thought that the treaties ending World War I had dealt unfairly with Germany. The policies that guided them with respect to their future relations with Germany were essentially defensive. The leader of Fascist Italy, Mussolini, was troubled by the Nazis' intentions regarding Austria, and refused an alliance with Hitler. In Moscow, some predicted that German fascism was merely the first stage of a communist revolution in Germany. The United States displayed less interest in the developments in Germany. Franklin Roosevelt took up the presidency at roughly the same time of Hitler's accession and the administration used most of its energy and efforts to stabilising and revitalising the economy after the crisis of 1929. Following the Nazis' triumph in the March 1933 elections, the American press predicted a lengthy Nazi tenure in Germany: Just as two and two make four, so suppression and intimidation have produced a Nazi- Nationalist triumph. The rest of the world may now accept the fact of ultra-Nationalist domination of the Reich and Prussia for a prolonged period with whatever results this entail' (Source: The New York Times , 6 March 1933) Foreign Policy Introduction Nazi diplomacy during its first years was conciliatory, promising a willingness to engage in dialogue as the government sought international recognition. At the same time, the regime used violent public rhetoric and took aggressive action to create territorial faits accomplis . Both paths were guided by a single major goal: to expand the borders of Germany. This foreign-policy agenda was dictated by the ideological principles of National Socialism, which called for creating a 'national state' typified by: a sound, viable relationship between the size and the growth of the nation, on the one hand, and the size and quality of the land on the other'. (Bracher 288) More On Undoing Versailles Attempting to reverse the Versailles treaty, and to expand the Reich to include all groups of German race, the Nazis began taking aggressive measures by early 1935. After a referendum held in the Saarland - a region adjoining France which had been under international administration - Germany announced on January 13, 1935, its liberation and annexation to the German Fatherland. Two months later Hitler ordered compulsory military service in order to rebuild the German army beyond the 100,000 Man limit set at Versailles. Drang nach Osten - Towards the East An intrinsic part of establishing the national state, as described in Mein Kampf , was the definition of the goals of expansion that would guide Nazi policies. These goals augured new intentions in German foreign policy: Thus, we National Socialists are deliberately drawing a line under the foreign policy of our pre-war years... We are putting a stop to the old Germanic movement toward the south and west of Europe and turning our attention to the land in the east... But if we today speak of new land, we think above all of Russia and its subject border states'. (Bracher 288) Foreign Policy in the Totalitarian State From Hitler's perspective, one of the prime functions of the totalitarian state was to create a strong organisational, military, and psychological infrastructure for decisive action in foreign affairs. Totalitarian rule required constant pressure and coercion, hence it was necessary to distract the population by creating the expectation of territorial expansion. Dramatic foreign policy achievements often 'compensated' the public for the revocation of civil liberties and other hardships resulting from domestic policy. Confrontation v Conciliation In a speech delivered to German army officers on February 3, 1933, Hitler made clear allusions to the path he would take to attain his foreign-policy goals: Foreign policy: Battle against Versailles, Equality of rights in Geneva. But useless if people do not have the will to fight... Building up of the armed forces: Most important prerequisite for achieving the goal of regaining political power, National Service must be reintroduced... How should political power be used when it has been gained? That is impossible to say yet. Perhaps fighting for new export possibilities, perhaps--and probably better - the conquest of new living space in the east and its ruthless Germani'. (Noakes & Pridham 508-9) In a memorandum to the Foreign Minister, from March 14, 1933, the Secretary of State in the German Foreign Ministry, Bernhard von Buelow, expressed his concern with Hitler's statement. He suggested that: In Germany's particular situation it is necessary to avoid diplomatic conflicts for as long as possible until we have become stronger. The world economic crisis gives us the great opportunity, through careful planning, to weather the storm better than others, and thereby to secure a reconstruction of the world economic situation to our advantage... By excluding political conflicts and concentrating on economic questions, we would avoid military dangers, which we are not at the moment equal to. A precipitate assertion of foreign policy demands would probably mobilise the important powers against us and jeopardise the fulfilment of these demands for a long time to come'. (Noakes & Pridham 656) More On Withdrawal from the League of Nations One of Germany's first actions in international relations was to withdraw from the League of Nations in October 1933. This withdrawal, prompted by Germany's wish to avoid international inspection of its rearmament, represented a reversal of German foreign policy. No longer could Germany argue that it was pursuing the Weimar Republic's moderate foreign policies. The notion of disarmament faded away. In a plebiscite on November 12, an absolute majority of Germans endorsed the Nazi government's decision to withdraw from the League of Nations. The country's Jewish citizens were conspicuous in their tendency to support the government's stance. An article in the Centralverein newspaper, appearing shortly before the plebiscite, stated the following: Like all the German people, we the Jews were called upon as citizens to cast our vote regarding the foreign policy of the government of the Reich. The equality of Germany among the nations is being sought. In spite of everything we have gone through, the vote of the German Jews can only be a 'yes''. (Source: C.V Zeitung, N. 42, 2 November 1933) The Economy Introduction In view of the dire economic crises that engulfed Germany when the Nazis took power, the government immersed itself in economic problems. According to Nazi ideology, the state should have a corporate economic structure, where the economy and society are closely knit and organised as they were before the advent of capitalism. This ideal was to be achieved in a modern industrial economy. Organisations like the Labour Front would autonomously regulate conflicts of interest in labor relations, market prices, and competition. Ironically, the corporate model assigns the state a special diminished status: by running the economy, the corporations would supposedly release the state from economic and social functions. In reality the Nazi leaders did not apply this economic ideology. Instead, they only adopted a few of its slogans, repeatedly stressing the dictatorial order that the state should introduce in economic affairs. State of the German Economy: 1933-1935 Solving the unemployment problem was one of the Nazis' major economic goals. The need to create jobs gave the government an economic incentive in its decision to redirect vast resources for rearmament programs that were essentially meant to serve political aims. The government also initiated public works that boosted demand for manpower. To solve the unemployment problem, however, it was also necessary to co-opt the private business sector. Thus, the government encouraged the leaders of industry to expand their enterprises and create further jobs by offering easy loans. The appointment of Dr. Hjalmar Schacht as commissioner of the Reichsbank (the central bank) in March 1933 and as Minister of Economy in August 1934 did much to maximise efficiencies in applying the Nazi economic policy and attaining its goals. Schacht himself attested to the difficulties that had come up in meeting two concurrent needs: to eradicate unemployment and raise the standard of living on the one hand, and to pledge maximum resources to rearmament on the other. The armament manufacturers, however, deliver military goods, which are produced but not on the market. From that follow two consequences: first, care must be taken that, aside from armament manufacture sufficient consumer goods are produced to sustain the population, including all those working for the armament industry. Second, the less that is consumed the more labour can be used for armaments; but the higher consumption rises, the more manpower must be left for the production of consumer goods. Therefore, the standard of living and the extent of armament production are in an inverse ratio'. (Noakes 392) Economic Recovery Despite the difficulty in fusing economic and political aims, the Nazis were successful in economic affairs because they had assured themselves total dominion. Their emergency orders, the elimination of dependency on coalition parties, and staffing government and public institutions with party hacks enabled them to apply their economic policies almost without hindrance. As recovery had already become visible by the end of 1932 for example before their ascent to power, the success of the Nazis in speeding up economic recovery was made easier. This was crucial in the German people's relatively swift acceptance of the Nazi regime. More On Agriculture - Implementing the Corporate Ideal Because several ideological tenets of their economic philosophy were embodied in agriculture, the Nazis aspired to apply a corporate ideal in this field. After being appointed as Minister of Agriculture in June 1933, Richard Darre established the Reichsnahrstand (RNS) The Reich Food Estate, which was broadly empowered to intervene and regulate agriculture. The RNS set prices and production quotas, dictated retailers' profit margins, and regulated the quality of farm produce. In September 1933, the Nazis also enacted the Erbhofsgesetz, the 'Entailed-Farm Law', under which a farm unit once bequeathed would be protected from subdivision, sale or attachment. This placed agriculture out of the reach of market-economy forces and gave it a preferred status. Indeed, the income of many German peasants improved during the Nazi's first two years in power. The ideological importance of protecting agriculture may be adduced from the preamble to the Entailed-Farm law: By upholding the old German custom of entailment, the Reich Government wishes to retain the peasantry as the blood spring of the German nation... (The Law) is intended to work towards a healthy distribution of agriculture units, since a large number of viable small and medium-sized farms, distributed as evenly as possible over the whole country, forms the best guarantee for the maintenance of the nation and the State'. (Noakes & Pridham 384-5) Nazification of Society and Culture Introduction Nazi ideology dictated that the new Reich should shape German social and cultural reality into a new national community ( Volksgemeinschaft ). The ideological and social-class tensions that typified the Weimar Republic were to be replaced by solidarity with the Volk and the racial ideology of National Socialism. Hence, during their first months in power, along with the totalitarian political and constitutional changes that they instituted, the Nazis simultaneously launched a massive propaganda campaign to convey the image of a new man, emerging in a new social and cultural order. Propaganda The Nazi party had seen the potential of propaganda since the 1920s. Hitler and his party colleague, Joseph Goebbels, recognised the importance of new media, such as cinema and radio broadcasting, as tools to manipulate public opinion and mobilise the masses. The potency of propaganda was also widely appreciated in Europe and America. However, the Nazis backed up their propaganda with violence and intimidation. In March 1933, Goebbels was named Minister of Propaganda and Enlightenment. In this capacity, he placed all media and all institutions of culture and endeavour under strict control. His ministry was also in charge of organising and staging mass rallies and mammoth demonstrations. These, embellished by military parades, militant Party anthems, and forests of flags, were carefully calculated to project a sense of power and inspire the public to identify with the Nazi movement and its ideology. Many of the symbols used were distortions of traditional Christian ones. On the tactics of propaganda in the modern age, Goebbels wrote: … it must be our task to instil into these propaganda facilities a modern feeling and bring them up to date. Technology must not be allowed to proceed ahead of the Reich; the Reich must go along with technology. Only the most modern things are good enough. We are living now in an age when the muses must support policies...It is the task of State propaganda so to simplify complicated ways of thinking that even the smallest man in the street may understand'. (Noakes & Pridham 334) More On Triumph of the Will Triumph of the Will was produced in 1935 and is based on the 1934 Nazi Party conference in Nuremberg. The film brought young German director Leni Riefenstahl international acclaim because of its powerful cinematography. Riefenstahl used the party conference merely as the backdrop for a film, which she intended to be an authentic documentary that glorified Hitler and the Nazis. Although the film has no narration, it begins with a written text describing the conference as a 'redemptive culmination' in German History. Soon the Fuehrer's aeroplane appears in the skies over Nuremberg. The landing sequence evokes the descent of a god from the heavens. As soon as he lands, however, Hitler is portrayed as a human, literally down-to-earth figure, who receives an enthusiastic welcome in the streets of the festooned city. The conference itself was to a large extent organised and staged because of the decision to produce the film. The placement of the party leaders against a backdrop of grandiose buildings, the large military parade ground, torch-light processions and carnival atmosphere, the masses of swastika flags - all these were crafted to aggrandise the Fuehrer and the Party, and to arouse feelings of pride and identification among the masses taking part in, and viewing, this immense production. In the service of propaganda, Triumph of the Will manufactured an historical event in order to create a theatrical production. Riefenstahl's Triumph became the classic propaganda film. Transformation of Society The new society the Nazis were to determined to create, which would embody the ideal of a national community (Volksgemeinschaft) , was to be based on relations of racial identity and unified by a shared Weltanschauung (world view). Such a united community would wield enough moral influence to elevate Germany to the world-power status it had aspired to for decades. Members of the Volksgemeinschaft must belong to the Aryan race and be genetically healthy, socially useful, and politically reliable. They must not only show total obedience, but also actively take part in the numerous regime-sponsored organisations that permeated Nazi society. They were also expected to enthusiastically demonstrate the symbolic gestures of loyalty prescribed by the Party. Heinz Vogt, who joined the Hitlerjugend in 1936, when he was ten years old, tells about the feelings that belonging to the 'community' roused: ...and this was actually a matter of honour, to be inside...one had yet a certain community. And I would like actually to say that the ideals that crystallised in the party or the person of the Fuehrer, were the things that were generally recommended: a great people's community, which tries from the plight of few jobs, bad pay and so on, to create an even better future, naturally always under the glorification of the race, the claim to leadership of the German people. This is utterly clear, this has always stood in the centre...' (Rosenthal 289) More On The Role of Women in the Volksgemeinschaft Like other sectors of German society in the 1930s, women's activities were co-ordinated at the national level through an agency that defined its function as part of the national community. The National-Socialist Women's League was founded in 1931 but became intensively active only after the Nazi seizure of power in 1933. Its main purpose was to convince German women and women's organisations of the correctness of Nazi ideology. In 1933, the Nazi Party laid down guiding principles for the nature of women's activity and the essence of the ideological role of the Women's League in the Volksgemeinschaft as follows: 'Principles of the National Socialist Women's League. 1. We seek an awakening, a renewal, and a re-education of women to equip them as guardians of the nation's reproductive life: sexual relations, marriage, motherhood and family, blood and race, youth and nation. A women's entire education, development, …and position within Volk and State must focus on the physical and spiritual responsibility of motherhood. 2. We realise and accept that the great transformation in women's lives over the last fifty years, in the wake of mechanisation, has brought with it a certain necessity for the education and official integration of the female work force in the interest of the nation, provided this does not prohibit the performance of their duty to marriage, family, and motherhood within the Volk . 3. We reject the misguided direction of the liberal-democratic international women's movement because they have not discovered new paths based on God and nation, which are rooted in women's souls... 4. We seek a movement for the revitalisation of womanhood that will reawaken profound female energies and will give women strength for their special charge in the future Germany. 5. We therefore call for and pursue the struggle against systematic debasement and destruction of women's honour and dignity, as well as against the moral corruption of youth. 6. At the same time we support the determination of German women--rooted in God, nature, family, Volk, and Fatherland--and we are establishing our own women's cultural program, which will take shape within the Third Reich. 7. We therefore, with all our energy, take part in the freedom movement's struggle for internal political change and, through exhaustive and penetrating propaganda, seek the establishment of the Third Reich.' (Sax & Kuntz 264-5) Nazification of Arts The Nazis' attempt to create a new socio-cultural framework was already expressed in the role they assigned the arts. In contrast to modern art, which they considered aesthetically repulsive and politically subversive, the New Art was to reflect and inculcate Nazi ideology. From this standpoint, art became a means to shape public opinion and define the national and racial ethos of German society. In portraying the approved themes of Nazi art - nature, the simple life, men and women radiating good health and joy - the artist was to strike a balance between functionality and beauty, utility and tradition. Nazi art, as perceived by the regime's leaders and ideologues, attested to a further step along Germany's path toward a national-cultural renaissance. By establishing the National Chamber of culture ( Reichskulturkammer), the regime imposed control on both the organisation of the arts and the content of artistic productions. The fixation of many Nazi artists with peasant life was meant to stress the tranquillity of rural existence, the peasants' physical and spiritual racial purity, and the connection between blood and soil, The German man emerged from the German peasantry'. More On 1 Nazi Architecture One of the artistic manifestations of Nazi culture was a new monolithic architecture. Albert Speer, the most prominent architect in Nazi Germany, believed that aesthetic design of industrial projects could, both physically and psychologically, enhance the conditions and performance of workers. Such design, he believed, would help re-enforce the image of a national community (Volksgemeinschaft) and help apply Hitler's concept of 'socialism of the deed'. The beauty of an architectural work is supposed to show that there is 'only one culture and one way of life--that of the German people'. Speer's doctrine, along with the design prowess and organisational aptitude he displayed in staging mammoth Party conferences, led Hitler and Goebbels to entrust him with several of Nazi Germany's largest architectural projects. More On 2 The Great German Art Exhibition On October 15 1933, Hitler lay the foundation stone for the "House of German Art" in Munich, which was planned by his favourite architect, Paul Ludwig Troost. It was the first building planned under the Nazi regime. In July 1937, "The Great German Art Exhibition" opened in the building. The exhibition was aimed at showing works of German art - works that, in the organisers' view, reflected the German nation's eternal values. Most of the pictures for the exhibition were chosen according to Hitler's personal taste. The exhibition, according to Hitler, had two main goals: 1. To give the honest German artist a platform on which to exhibit. 2. To give the German people a chance to see and purchase this work. 'The Great German Art Exhibition" was in fact a part of a German tradition in which German artists exhibited their works annually. However, the difference between previous exhibition and the present one was that in this case it was held under the auspices and supervision of the Nazi regime. The Nazis' attitude to art and the ideological-functional role they intended for it, had led many artists to leave Germany. The Nazis thus detached German culture from its international connections, and they repeatedly emphasised the racial dimensions that German art had to express.